Understanding communicative intentions in schizophrenia using an error analysis approach by Parola, Alberto et al.
ARTICLE OPEN
Understanding communicative intentions in schizophrenia
using an error analysis approach
Parola Alberto 1,5, Claudio Brasso2,5✉, Rosalba Morese 3,4, Paola Rocca2 and Francesca M. Bosco1
Patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) have a core impairment in the communicative-pragmatic domain, characterized by severe
difficulties in correctly inferring the speaker’s communicative intentions. While several studies have investigated pragmatic
performance of patients with SCZ, little research has analyzed the errors committed in the comprehension of different
communicative acts. The present research investigated error patterns in 24 patients with SCZ and 24 healthy controls (HC) during
a task assessing the comprehension of different communicative acts, i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic, and their relationship with
the clinical features of SCZ. We used signal detection analysis to quantify participants’ ability to correctly detect the speakers’
communicative intention, i.e., sensitivity, and their tendency to wrongly perceive a communicative intention when not present,
i.e., response bias. Further, we investigated the relationship between sensitivity and response bias, and the clinical features of the
disorder, namely symptom severity, pharmacotherapy, and personal and social functioning. The results showed that the ability to
infer the speaker’s communicative intention is impaired in SCZ, as patients exhibited lower sensitivity, compared to HC, for all the
pragmatic phenomena evaluated, i.e., sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. Further, we found that the sensitivity
measure for irony was related to disorganized/concrete symptoms. Moreover, patients with SCZ showed a stronger response bias
for deceitful communicative acts compared to HC: when committing errors, they tended to misattribute deceitful intentions more
often than sincere and ironic ones. This tendency to misattribute deceitful communicative intentions may be related to the
attributional bias characterizing the disorder.
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INTRODUCTION
Pragmatics has traditionally been defined as the ability to
communicate appropriately in a social context using language1,2.
In order to understand our partners’ communicative intentions,
we are often required to use inferential processes to fill the gap
that occurs between the literal meaning of an utterance and the
speaker’s meaning, i.e., what the speaker intends to commu-
nicate with that utterance, as for example in “Well done!” said by
the speaker to ironically remark to the listener that s/he barely
kicked the ball and it hit a plant pot standing on a window sill.
Several studies in the literature have demonstrated that patients
with schizophrenia (SCZ) have a pervasive impairment in the
communicative-pragmatic domain3–11, characterized by severe
difficulties in drawing the inferences necessary to correctly
recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions.
Communicative-pragmatic deficits in patients with SCZ have
been described at multiple levels: previous studies reported
difficulties in the comprehension of non-literal and figurative
forms of language, namely indirect speech acts12,13, irony4,6,7,9,
metaphors and idioms5,8,14,15, as well as narrative and conversa-
tional impairment16, and in the recognition and recovery of
communicative failures17 and deceitful communicative acts18–20.
Moreover, some studies showed that patients exhibit an increas-
ing level of difficulty in the comprehension and production of
communicative acts proffered with different communicative
intentions: subjects with SCZ showed a decreasing trend of
performance in the comprehension and production of sincere,
deceitful, and ironic communicative acts7,19. The authors
explained this tendency as being due to the increasing inferential
ability necessary to correctly comprehend each type of pragmatic
expression7,19. These studies suggested that communicative
difficulties in SCZ might mainly stem from a specific problem in
the inference-making processes necessary to derive the speaker’s
(correct) communicative intention.
Recently, communicative-pragmatic language dysfunction
was proposed as an important cognitive marker for the
disorder10,21–23, with good prediction accuracy in classifying
patients with SCZ vs. controls24,25, and as being associated with
specific clinical features of the disorder4,26–28. In particular, deficits
in communicative-pragmatic abilities were associated with clinical
traits such as disorganized/concrete symptoms26, positive symp-
toms29,30, and formal thought disorders4. Moreover, pragmatic
dysfunction has been found to be related to the social impairment
seen in the disorder, with several studies reporting an association
between deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to ascribe
mental states to others31, and pragmatic impairments6,9,13,32.
Despite some studies used pragmatic tasks, as irony or sarcasm
comprehension, to investigate ToM33, recent researches high-
lighted how pragmatic ability and ToM are two not completely
overlapping domains8,24,34–37. These research showed as the
development of pragmatic competence is supported by a
functional maturation of inference-making brain structures rather
than a maturation of ToM areas38–40, as pragmatic and Theory of
Mind deficits are partially dissociated in many clinical condi-
tions8,9,19,41–44, and as pragmatic and theory of mind tasks involve
partially different neural circuits37,45–50, thus suggesting the
specificity of communicative ability with respect to other cognitive
domains39,40,42,51.
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While previous studies investigated pragmatic performance of
patients with SCZ by using a variety of different pragmatic tasks,
little research has focused on analyzing the errors committed in
the comprehension of different communicative acts. Error analysis
may be highly informative as to the clinical and cognitive
processes underlying patients’ failures in communicative-
pragmatic tasks and may thus provide a critical insight into the
condition and its clinical features. Indeed, different factors can
underlie difficulties of patients with SCZ in recognizing different
communicative intentions, leading to different error patterns.
Individuals with SCZ have a strong tendency to misattribute
intentions to other persons. For example, patients with high
degree of suspiciousness may interpret a simple question like “Do
you live nearby?”, when asked by a passer-by, as an attempt to
force them to reveal personal information in order to deceive
or circumvent them. Or they might attribute a communicative
intention to a person who has no intention of communicating
with them3,52,53. This tendency could be related to clinical
symptoms, such as persecutory delusion, which may lead patients
to attribute malevolent intents to other people, such as those of
deceiving or harming them. Indeed, previous studies showed that
patients with SCZ have a strong tendency to misattribute the
speaker’s communicative intentions, and that this tendency can
interact with the condition and its clinical features such as
paranoid symptoms18,29 and persecutory delusions30.
Different response patterns in pragmatic tasks can thus reflect
an a priori tendency, i.e., bias, to select a specific response
category instead of another, which in turn may reflect specific
aspects of the disease and its clinical features. However, by only
analyzing patients’ overall pragmatic performance, i.e., accuracy
rate, it is difficult to disentangle whether their errors are due to a
specific bias in attributing some kind of communicative intention
to others, such as a tendency to interpret a statement as deceitful
or literal, or to a diffuse, global deficit in interpreting commu-
nicative intentions irrespective of the specific kind of commu-
nicative act. Instead, by analyzing error patterns it is possible to
identify whether a systematic bias characterizes the errors
committed by patients with SCZ, and in that case to determine
their tendency to respond by selecting a specific response
category. Error analysis may thus help to shed light on potential
causes of patients’ difficulties in inferring communicative inten-
tions and to evaluate the relationship between these deficits and
specific clinical features of the disorder.
Signal detection theory (SDT) is a framework used to model
performance in tasks which require participants to identify when a
stimulus is present (signal) and when the stimulus is absent
(noise)54–57. The advantages of using SDT to analyze participants’
performance in pragmatic tasks is that it allows to evaluate
separately sensitivity i.e., the ability of participants to correctly
identify when the signal is present (e.g., the correct identification
of the speaker’s ironic communicative intention) while avoiding
incorrect identification (false alarms), and response bias, i.e., an a
priori tendency to give one response over another. The latter
measure may prove particularly useful in explaining systematic
patterns of error committed by participants. Signal‐detection
theory may thus provide a useful framework for a more in-depth
analysis of participants’ accuracy and a more detailed analyses of
participants’ errors patterns. No previous study used the SDT to
analyze errors patterns in tasks assessing patients’ with SCZ ability
to comprehend another’s person communicative intentions.
The main goal of the present study is to investigate error
patterns in patients with SCZ during a task assessing the
comprehension of different communicative acts, i.e., sincere,
deceitful and ironic communicative acts, and their relationship
with the clinical features of SCZ.
The originality of the present study is in the focus on error
analysis using the signal detection theory framework. SDT analysis
can be used to quantify the ability of participants to correctly
detect the signal when it is present, i.e., sensitivity, and their
tendency to wrongly perceive the stimulus when it is not present,
i.e., response bias, for example the tendency to recognize a
statement having a specific communicative intention, such as
being ironic even when it is not ironic, but is, instead, sincere or
deceitful, for instance. We aim to investigate whether patients
with SCZ exhibit a specific a priori tendency, i.e., bias, to select a
specific response category instead of others. Furthermore, we
wish to investigate the relationship between sensitivity and
response bias and specific clinical features of the disorder such as:
symptom severity, pharmacological treatment, and personal and
social functioning.
RESULTS
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample
Demographic characteristics of patients with SCZ and HC are
reported in Table 1. No statistically significant differences emerged
between the two groups in age, education, and gender (Two-
sided T-tests: 0.90 > t > 0.50, 0.82 > p > 0.75, see Table 1). Clinical
characteristics of the SCZ group are shown in Table 2.
Descriptive statistics of the pragmatic task
The mean accuracy rate (SD) of control participants was 93.8 (10.8)
for the sincere condition, 82.3 (13.4) for the deceitful condition,
and 83.7 (13.3) for the ironic condition; the mean accuracy rate of
participants with SCZ was 81.3 (19.2) for the sincere condition,
66.31 (27.5) for the deceitful condition, and 57.0 (24.5) for the
ironic condition (see Table 3).
Signal detection analysis
The results showed a significant effect of Group on sensitivity (d’),
i.e., the probability of participants giving correct responses (hits)
for each category of communicative acts while avoiding incorrect
ones (false alarms). Sensitivity provides a measure of how a
participant is able to detect the signal (correct responses) outside
of subjective bias (false alarms), while accuracy, usually used in
traditional behavior analysis, only quantifies correct responses. In
detail, patients showed lower sensitivity than controls, that is, they
were not as good at identifying the speaker’s communicative
intention (signals) for all the communicative phenomena exam-
ined, i.e., sincere (b=−0.41, SE= 0.19, t=−2.17, p < 0.05),
deceitful (b=−0.86, SE= 0.19, t=−4.51, p < 0.0001) and ironic
communicative acts (b=−0.67, SE= 0.19, t=−3.54, p < 0.001).
Participants with SCZ were less able than controls in identifying
the speaker’s communicative intention (signals) in correct trials
(hits, e.g., irony in ironic trials) while avoiding incorrect responses
(false alarms, e.g., responding irony in non-ironic trials). The
analysis also showed a significant effect of general intelligence
(b= 0.27, SE= 0.07, t= 3.71, p < 0.001), i.e., a higher level of
general intelligence was associated with higher sensitivity (see
Table 4 and Fig. 1). However, differences in sensitivity between
patients and controls for the different communicative acts still
remained significant after controlling for the role of the covariates,
i.e., level of intelligence, age, and gender.
Table 1. Demographic characteristics.
SCZ group HC group Statistic F/χ2 p value
Age, years 40.2 (11.7) 39.4 (11.5) 0.050 0.824
Gender (M/F) 16/8 17/7 0.097 0.755
Education, years 13,7 (4,3) 13,9 (4,2) 0.090 0.765
M male, F female, SCZ schizophrenia, HC healthy control, Mean and
standard deviation (SD).
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Response bias represents the extent to which participants tend
to commit errors by choosing a specific response category. This
makes it possible to identify a specific error tendency which may
be informative as to the clinical and cognitive factors underlying
patients’ failures.
We found a significant effect of Group on response bias, as
participants with SCZ showed a lower Beta value for deceitful
communicative acts when compared to healthy controls (b=
0.40, SE= 0.19, p < .05). A lower Beta value corresponds to a
stronger response bias and a more liberal response criterion, i.e.,
a lower threshold, compared to HC, for choosing the deceitful
category as a response option. In other words, patients with SCZ
showed a greater tendency to respond “deceit” in both deceitful
and non-deceitful trials than controls (see Table 4 and Fig. 2). We
found no differences between patients and controls on response
bias for sincere (b=−0.05, SE= 0.14, p= 0.72) and ironic
communicative acts (b=−0.19, SE= 0.15, p= 0.20). We found
no effect of covariates, i.e., general intelligence, age, and gender
on response bias.
Relationship with clinical variables
In the group of participants with SCZ, the regression analysis
showed an effect of disorganized/concrete (DIS) symptoms on
sensitivity: patients with higher DIS symptoms rated using the
PANSS showed a lower sensitivity for irony (b=−0.49, SE= 0.16,
p < 0.01). Severity of positive (POS), negative (Avl and ExD factors),
and depressive (CDSS score) symptoms, and antipsychotic daily
equivalent dosage (CPZ equivalent), were not significantly
associated with sensitivity. Response bias was not significantly
affected by any of the clinical variables assessed (see Table 5).
Finally, we did not find a significant role of beta and d’ values in
predicting patients’ performance on the PSP scale.
DISCUSSION
In the present study we examined the error patterns of patients
with SCZ and healthy controls in a task assessing pragmatic
comprehension of communicative acts uttered with different
communicative intentions, i.e., sincere, deceitful, and ironic. More
specifically, we set out to investigate whether patients with SCZ
exhibit specific a priori tendencies, i.e., bias, to select a specific
response category, and to shed light on the relationship between
such tendencies and the clinical features of the disorder. To this
aim we used the signal detection theory framework to model
participants’ performance and quantify their ability to discrimi-
nate between signal and noise, i.e., sensitivity, and their tendency
to respond by choosing a specific response category, i.e.,
response bias.
The results confirmed that the ability to infer the speaker’s
communicative intention is impaired in SCZ. More specifically, in
line with previous studies5–9,58, we found that patients with SCZ
exhibited lower sensitivity, in terms of the ability to correctly
detect the speaker’s communicative intentions, compared to
healthy controls, for all the pragmatic phenomena evaluated, i.e.,
sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. The sensitivity
measure has some advantages over traditional accuracy measures,
which only quantify correct responses. Indeed, by using this
measure, we showed that the difficulties of patients in recognizing
the speaker’s communicative intentions, i.e., lower sensitivity, are
due to different reasons. In the case of irony, such lower sensitivity
is mainly due to a low proportion of correct responses in ironic
trials. Instead, in the case of deceit, patients showed a higher
proportion of correct responses than for irony, but also a higher
rate of false alarms, so that sensitivity values were similar. We also
found a significant role of general intelligence in explaining the
sensitivity measure, which confirms previous evidence showing
that intelligence may have a role in pragmatic understanding59,60.
However, even after controlling for the role of general intelligence,
the differences in the sensitivity index between patients and
controls remain significant, pointing to the specificity of the deficit
in the recognition of communicative intentions5,6,61. Overall, this
result supports recent studies proposing pragmatic impairment as
a core feature of SCZ10,21–25, with patients exhibiting severe
deficits in high-level language skills.
Further, by analyzing participants’ error patterns, we found that,
when committing errors, patients with SCZ tend to select the
“deceitful” category more often than the other ones, i.e., sincere
and ironic. This is reflected in a stronger response bias for deceitful
communicative acts in the group of patients with SCZ, compared
to HC, and indicates a strong a priori tendency of patients to
respond “deceit” in both deceitful and non-deceitful trials.
Table 2. Clinical characteristics.
Age at illness onset, years 26.50 (7.63)
Duration of illness, years 14.16 (10.33)
PANSS – POS, score 7.42 (2.02)
PANSS – DIS, score 6.96 (2.61)
BNSS – Avl, score 21.83 (8.28)
BNSS – ExD, score 12.00 (6.65)
CDSS, total score 3.88 (4.90)
PSP, score 60.29 (13.94)
CPZ equivalent, mg/day 390.22 (144.62)
PANSS Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, POS positive symptoms, DIS
disorganized/concrete symptoms, BNSS Brief Negative Symptoms, Avl
avolition dimension, ExD expressive deficit dimension, CDSS Calgary
Depression Scale for Schizophrenia, PSP Personal and Social Performance
Scale, CPZ chlorpromazine. Mean and standard deviation (SD).
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of participants’ performance in the pragmatic task.
Communicative acts
Measures Sincere Deceit Irony
SCZ HC SCZ HC SCZ HC
Hits/accuracy 9.75 (2.31) 11.25 (1.29) 7.96 (3.3) 9.88 (1.60) 6.84 (2.94) 10.02 (2.27)
False alarms 2.3 (3.24) 1.0 (1.59) 4.17 (2.85) 1.71 (2.22) 2.80 (2.50) 1.54 (1.38)
Responses not given 0.63 (0.92) 0.21 (0.41) 0.79 (1.14) 0.21 (0.41) 0.88 (1.03) 0.17 (0.38)
Correct rejections 21.75 (3.3) 23 (1.59) 19.92 (2.80) 22.3 (2.22) 21.29 (2.53) 22.42 (1.38)
For each subject we report the mean number and standard deviation of hits (correct responses), false alarms (incorrect responses), responses not given, and
correct rejections for each category (i.e., sincere, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts) in the two groups (SCZ and HC).
P. Alberto et al.
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The tendency to misattribute deceitful communicative inten-
tions to other people’s utterances, irrespective of the context and
of the true communicative intention, can be explained by the
attributional bias characterizing this disorder. This bias describes
the way in which individuals explain the causes, or make sense, of
social events or interactions62,63. Indeed, hostile attributional style
is a core dimension of altered social cognition in SCZ64,65.
We did not find any relationship between response bias and
clinical features of the disorder. This can be explained by the fact
that patients were clinically stable and achieved low or moderate
scores in all the psychopathological dimensions assessed. Our result
is consistent with previous studies which demonstrated that one-
sided and monocausal attribution styles, sustained by poor
metacognition, are trait markers of SCZ, independently of the
severity of symptoms66,67. In this view, the impairment in
metacognitive monitoring on cognitive tasks combined with a
hostile attributional bias can explain patients’ response bias, i.e., a
more liberal response tendency, for “deceit” observed in the present
study without needing the involvement of specific symptoms.
This finding is in line with previous studies showing that
patients with SCZ tend to misattribute other people’s intentions.
However, previous studies mainly focused on mentalizing errors,
such as erroneous attribution of beliefs, emotions, and desires,
and found that these errors may concur with the maintenance of
clinical symptoms, such as persecutory delusions68,69. In the
present study, we rather focused on investigating the recognition
of communicative intentions in SCZ during a communicative-
pragmatic task. We showed that the tendency to misattribute
mental states also extends to the ascription of communicative
intentions, specifically resulting in a bias which leads patients to
misattribute deceitful communicative intentions.
As far as the relationship between sensitivity and clinical
features is concerned, we found that the sensitivity measure for
the irony condition was related to disorganized/concrete symp-
toms, i.e., conceptual disorganization (P2), difficulty in abstract
thinking (N5), and poor attention (G11) of the PANSS. In detail,
these three psychopathological elements were associated with
a low level of accuracy in the irony condition principally due to a
small proportion of correct responses in ironic trials and not to a
wrong choice of this communicative intention in non-ironic trials
Table 4. Regression models comparing patients with SCZ and HC.





intelligence+ (1 | ID)
Sincere 3.15 0.14 22.75 <0.001
Deceit 2.91 0.14 21.01 <0.001
Irony 2.93 0.14 21.18 <0.001
Level of
intelligence
0.27 0.07 3.71 <0.001
Age −0.14 0.07 −1.97 0.055
Gender −0.29 0.16 1.82 0.076
Sincere:
Group= SCZ
−0.41 0.19 −2.17 <0.05
Deceit:
Group= SCZ
−0.86 0.19 −4.51 <0.001
Irony: Group
= SCZ






intelligence+ (1 | ID)
Sincere 0.78 0.11 6.82 <0.001
Deceit 0.83 0.12 6.93 <0.001
Irony 0.89 0.12 7.04 <0.001
Level of
intelligence
0.02 0.06 0.29 0.76
Age 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.93
Gender −0.11 0.12 −0.94 0.35
Sincere:
Group= SCZ
−0.05 0.14 −0.35 0.72
Deceit:
Group= SCZ
0.40 0.19 2.07 <0.05
Irony: Group
= SCZ
−0.19 0.15 −1.29 0.20
b beta regression coefficient, SE standard error, t t-value. The response bias
model was fitted using a Gamma distribution with an inverse link, thus
positive beta regression coefficients (e.g., 0.40 for deceit in group of
patients with SCZ) indicate lower beta values.
Fig. 2 Response bias (Beta) values for sincere, deceitful, and
ironic communicative acts in SCZ and HC groups. Note: The
horizontal line corresponds to the mean of the different groups
(SCZ= schizophrenia, HC= healthy controls) for the different
communicative acts (Sincere: SCZ= 1.71 (sd= 1.63), HC= 1.47
(0.96), Cohen’s d: −0.17 [−0.74, 0.39]; Deceit: SCZ= 0.93 (0.55); HC=
1.37 (1.06), Cohen’s d: 0.52 [−0.06, 1.09]; Irony: SCZ= 1.80 (1.77),
HC= 1.22 (1.00), Cohen’s d: −0.40 [−0.97, 0.17]), and the rectangle
represents the Bayesian highest density interval. Higher Beta values
indicate more conservative responding, while lower Beta values
indicate more liberal responding. **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05.
Fig. 1 Sensitivity (d-prime) values for sincere, deceitful, and ironic
communicative acts in the SCZ and HC groups. Note: The
horizontal line corresponds to the mean of the different groups
(SCZ= schizophrenia, HC= healthy controls) for the different
communicative acts (Sincere: SCZ= 2.81 (sd= 0.81), HC= 3.33
(0.56), Cohen’s d: 0.75 [0.16, 1.34]; Deceit: SCZ= 2.15 (0.88), Cohen’s
d: 1.24 [0.62, 1.86]; HC= 3.01 (0.63); Irony: SCZ= 2.32 (0.87), HC=
3.09 (0.48), Cohen’s d: 1.10 [0.48, 1.70]), and the rectangle represents
the Bayesian highest density interval. **p < 0.01 *, p < 0.05.
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(i.e., sincere and deceitful). In other words, the more severe the
disorganized/concrete symptoms, the less patients choose irony
as an option. This result is consistent with other studies on irony
detection where people with SZ were asked to recognize irony in
a pragmatic task19,70. Furthermore, the association between the
severity of disorganized/concrete symptoms and the difficulty in
detecting irony is in line with a previous study26 that reported a
significant relationship between higher scores in the PANSS items
conceptual disorganization (P2) and difficulty in abstract thinking
(N5) and concretism, i.e., the tendency to adhere to the literal
meaning of utterances. In this view, the impaired comprehension
of both ironic communicative acts and metaphors and proverbs is
probably sustained by a common inferential deficit closely linked
to disorganized/concrete symptoms.
The present study demonstrated the potential of using signal
detection analysis in modeling error patterns of patients with SCZ in
a communicative-pragmatics task. For example, previous studies
observed that patients with SCZ have a strong tendency to adhere
to the literal meaning of an utterance, i.e., concretism, and that this
tendency may be responsible for patients’ errors in comprehending
figurative or non-literal expressions. Patients may be biased toward
the literal interpretation of an utterance, thus overlooking the non-
literal and indirect meaning27,42,71. A recent study by Bambini
et al.26, investigated concretism in SCZ across different figurative
expressions, i.e., proverbs, idioms and metaphors, and pragmatic
tasks. The authors found figurative language comprehension to be
largely impaired in SCZ, and observed that the tendency for
concretism is linked to the clinical features of the disease, i.e., the
presence of formal thought disorder and difficulties in abstract
thinking. A future avenue of investigation would be to test whether
patients with SCZ show a response bias toward the literal
interpretation of figurative expressions using the signal detection
theory framework. We did not observe this tendency in the present
study, although we were not specifically concerned with evaluating
the comprehension of figurative expressions for which concretism
has been reported in previous studies5,72,73.
A limit of the present study regards the characteristics of our
sample. Indeed, we tested a population of patients with a chronic
and stable disease, while it would be interesting to assess whether
the observed bias differs for patients with a short disease history
(<2 years). Finally, the sample size of this study is relatively small.
Further studies are needed to replicate the present findings and
further elucidate the relationship between symptoms, neuro and
social cognition, and pragmatic comprehension in people with SCZ.
In conclusion, we systematically analyzed error patterns in
patients with SCZ and healthy controls (HC) during a task assessing
the comprehension of different communicative acts, and their
relationship with the clinical features of SCZ. We found patients
with SCZ to be impaired in their ability to infer the speaker’s
communicative intention for all the pragmatic phenomena
evaluated, i.e., sincere, deceitful and ironic communicative acts,
and that the impairment in irony recognition is related to
disorganized/concrete symptoms. Moreover, patients with SCZ
showed a stronger response bias for deceitful communicative acts,
possibly related to the attributional bias characterizing the disorder.
The study showcases the potential of modeling error patterns of
patients with SCZ during a communicative-pragmatics task and
offers useful suggestions for the creation of specific rehabilitation
programs74,75 focused on helping patients to overcome their
communicative difficulties. A correct comprehension of other
people’s communicative intentions is essential to achieve real-life
goals like getting and maintaining a job and having stable
interpersonal relationships. Therefore, the implementation of
neurocognitive rehabilitation and social skills training combined
with treatments74,75 specifically focused on communicative-
pragmatic ability could broad the spectrum of activity of the
cognitive remediation programs, thus enhancing their efficacy in
improving interpersonal and work functioning of people with SZ.
METHODS
Participant
Twenty-four individuals with established SCZ and 24 healthy controls (HC)
were included in the study. Patients with SCZ and HC were matched for
age, gender, and education. Individuals diagnosed with SCZ met the
following criteria: (1) diagnosed with schizophrenia according to DSM 5
(APA 2013) criteria, confirmed using the SCID 5 CV (APA 2015), (2) no other
current diagnosis of mental disorder other than schizophrenia, (3) clinically
Table 5. Selected models for the clinical factors predicting sensitivity and response bias in the SCZ group.
Model specification Fixed effects b SE T p-value
Sensitivity
dprime ~ Communicative phenomenon+
Communicative phenomenon: Symptoms=DIS+ (1 | I D)
Sincere 2.81 0.16 17.5 <0.001
Deceit 2.15 0.16 13.3 <0.001
Irony 2.32 0.16 14.4 <0.001
Sincere: Symptoms=DIS −0.32 0.16 −1.98 0.06
Deceit: Symptoms=DIS −0.25 0.16 −1.5 0.13
Irony: Symptoms=DIS 0.49 0.16 −3.0 <0.01
Response bias
beta ~ Communicative phenomenon+
Communicative phenomenon: Symptoms (CDSS)+
Communicative phenomenon: Symptoms= Avl+ (1 | ID)
Sincere 0.79 0.11 6.95 <0.001
Deceit 1.15 0.15 7.93 <0.001
Irony 0.74 0.11 6.78 <0.001
Sincere: Symptoms= CDSS −0.01 0.10 −0.13 0.89
Deceit: Symptoms= CDSS −0.7 0.18 −0.39 0.69
Irony: Symptoms= CDSS 0.27 0.15 1.82 0.07
Sincere: Symptoms= Avl −0.26 0.14 −1.89 0.60
Deceit: Symptoms= Avl 0.13 0.16 0.87 0.38
Irony: Symptoms= Avl −0.003 0.1 −0.3 0.98
b beta regression coefficient, SE standard error, t t-value, ID participant, DIS disorganized/concrete symptoms, Avl avolition dimension, consisting of anhedonia,
asociality and avolition symptoms of the Brief Negative Symptoms Scale (BNSS), CDSS Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia total score.
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stable, i.e., absence of hospitalization and treatment modification in the
last six months. All participants had to meet the following inclusion criteria
to take part in the experiment: (1) aged between 18 and 65 years, (2) no
previous history of neurological illness, (3) basic cognitive and linguistic
abilities demonstrated by achieving a cut-off score in the following
neuropsychological tests: Test di Intelligenza Breve76, Italian equivalent of
the National Adult Reading Test77 (NART; cut-off score 70) and two sub-
scales (Comprehension of written words and comprehension of written
sentences) of the Aachener Aphasie Test78 (AAT; cut-off 112/120), (4) Italian
native speakers. HC had to meet the following inclusion criteria: (1) no
current use of psychoactive drugs, (2) no personal or family history of
psychiatric disorders. All participants gave their written informed consent
and took part in the study on a voluntary basis. The study was approved by
the Local Research Ethics Committee (protocol number: 0076364).
Clinical assessment
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS)79 was used to rate the
severity of positive (POS) and disorganized/concrete symptoms (DIS),
according to the solution proposed by Wallwork et al.80. Positive symptoms
were assessed using four items of the PANSS: P1 (delusions), P3 (hallucinatory
behavior), P5 (grandiosity), G9 (unusual thought content). Disorganized/
concrete symptoms were assessed using three items of the PANSS scale: P2
(conceptual disorganization), N5 (difficulty in abstract thinking), and G11
(poor attention). Negative symptoms were assessed using the Italian version
of the Brief Negative Symptoms Scale (BNSS)81, and grouped into two factors:
“avolition” (Avl), consisting of anhedonia, asociality and avolition, and
“expressive deficits” (ExD), including blunted affect and alogia82,83. Depres-
sive symptoms were evaluated using the Calgary Depression Scale for
Schizophrenia (CDSS)84. Higher scores represent greater symptom severity.
The level of functioning was evaluated with the Personal and Social
Performance Scale85 (PSP). Higher scores represent a higher level of
functioning. Antipsychotic dosage was converted to chlorpromazine (CPZ)
equivalent dose using an established conversion methodology86. The clinical
characteristics of the SZ group are summarized in Table 2.
Assessment of general intelligence
To estimate general intelligence, we used “Test di Intelligenza Breve (TIB,
i.e., Brief Intelligence Test76), an Italian version of the National Adult
Reading Test (NART). The TIB consists of a list of 54 words (34 words with
irregular accent for the actual test and 20 words with high frequency of use
as control stimuli), which the participants have to read aloud. The final
score is calculated by summing up the number of words pronounced
correctly. The IQ score (total IQ) is then estimated by using the formula
reported in Colombo et al.76.
Pragmatic assessment
The assessment was conducted using 36 short stories, each followed by a
target sentence designed to test participants’ comprehension of sincere,
deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. Each story was made up of two
parts, i.e., a context and a target sentence. The first part explained the
context and outlined the scenario in which the events would take place.
Each story had two characters and ended with one of them saying
something to the other, whose answer was the target sentence. We
used three different context-scenarios to propose three different commu-
nicative intentions: sincere, deceitful, and ironic (see Supplementary Table
1 for an example of the story). The three context-scenarios associated with
each (identical) target sentence were comparable in their level of difficulty,
number of words and syllables, and the Gulpease readability index (see
Supplementary Table 2). The experimental material had already been
validated in a previous study to make sure the target sentences were
correctly interpreted (see Bosco et al.49).
Procedure
At the beginning of the session, subjects were tested using the ‘Test di
Intelligenza Breve’ (TIB) and the other cut-off tests, i.e., the two sub-scales
(Comprehension of written words and comprehension of written
sentences) of the Aachener Aphasie Test (AAT). Next, participants
completed the communicative-pragmatic task, during which they read
the story contexts followed by each target sentence. When the target
sentence disappeared, participants had to recognize the speaker’s
communicative intention by pressing a button to choose from among
the three alternative response options: (1) sincere (2) deceitful (3) ironic.
Correct responses received a score of 1. We created two different protocols
(A and B) so that the order of trial presentation was pseudorandomized
and counterbalanced across participants. Participants completed the task
individually. When they arrived at the hospital, they were instructed on the
task and they completed three practice trials (not included in the final
stories) before the start of the experiment. The experimental task was
divided into two blocks each lasting approximately 20min, with a brief
pause (2–3min) between the two blocks, for a total time of 45min.
Statistical analysis
Statistical analyses were performed using R software and Psycho
package87,88. First we performed the signal detection analysis. The
responses given in the pragmatic task used in the present study were
analyzed using the signal detection theory (SDT) framework. SDT is
generally applied when participants have to identify two (or more) different
stimuli, where the task consists in discerning when the stimulus is present
(signal) and when the stimulus is absent (noise). In our task, the correct
identification of the speaker’s communicative intention corresponds to a hit,
i.e., the probability of the subject reporting the signal as present when it
actually is present. Instead, the incorrect identification of the speaker’s
intention (e.g., interpreting an ironic statement as deceitful or sincere)
corresponds to a false alarm, i.e., the probability of the subject reporting
that the signal is present when it is absent. SDT analysis models the
relationship between hit and false alarm rates and provides distinct
quantitative indices of: a) Sensitivity, which is the ability to discriminate
between signal and noise, corresponding in our task to the ability of a
subject to correctly identify the speaker’s communicative intention.
Sensitivity is calculated as the standardized value of the hit rate (i.e.,
correct responses) minus giving correct responses (hits) for each category
while avoiding incorrect ones (false alarms). In this way, it offers more
advantages than a simple measure of accuracy, which only quantifies b)
Response bias, which is the general tendency of a subject to respond by
choosing a specific response category (e.g., deceit). For example, in our task
a participant may have a tendency to respond “deceit”, and thus be more
likely to respond “deceit” regardless of the type of trial (i.e., sincere, deceitful
or ironic). This will result in a high proportion of “deceit” responses in signal
trials (i.e., deceit trials, when the communicative intention was deceitful),
and thus in a high hit rate (correct responses for the deceitful condition).
However, it will also result in high rate of “deceit” responses in noise trials
(i.e., sincere or ironic conditions), and thus in a high rate of false alarms. In
this case, we say the subject is using a liberal criterion, meaning the criterion
(threshold) s/he is adopting to decide whether a statement is deceitful or
not is very low, and this results in a high proportion of “deceit” responses in
both deceitful and non-deceitful (sincere and ironic) trials. The opposite
situation occurs when a subject has a tendency to not respond “deceit”. This
will result in a low proportion of “deceit” responses in signal trials (i.e., deceit
trials), and thus in a lowhit rate (correct responses); but it will also result in a
low rate of “deceit” responses in noise trials (i.e., sincere or ironic trials), and
thus in a low rate of false alarms. In this latter case the subject isusing a
conservative criterion, meaning the criterion (threshold) s/he is adopting to
decide whether a statement is deceitful or not is very high, and this results
in a low proportion of “deceit” responses in both deceitful and non-deceitful
trials. The advantages of using SDT to analyze participants’ performance in
pragmatic tasks is that it allows sensitivity i.e., the ability of participants to
correctly identify the speaker’s communicative intention (i.e., signal) while
avoiding incorrect identification (false alarms), and response bias, i.e., an a
priori tendency to give one response over another, to be evaluated
separately. The latter measure may prove particularly useful in explaining
systematic patterns of error committed by participants. For each subject we
computed the number of hits (correct responses), false alarms (incorrect
responses, e.g., interpreting an ironic statement as deceitful), responses not
given, and correct rejections (not responding “irony” when irony is not
present, as in deceitful and sincere trials) for each category (i.e., sincere,
deceitful, and ironic communicative acts). As an example, if a participant
correctly recognizes 8/12 ironic trials, and wrongly recognizes 4 non-ironic
trials as ironic, this will result in 8/12 hits and 4/24 false alarms for the irony
category. We then computed measures of sensitivity and response bias (B)
using the R package Psycho software according to the formula provided in
Pallier89. When the bias toward one response over another increases, i.e.,
the subject uses a liberal criterion, beta values decrease to 0. By contrast,
when the bias toward one response over another decreases, i.e., a subject is
using a conservative criterion, beta values increase to more than 1 on an
open-ended scale. Then a generalized linear model (GLM) was employed
in order to analyze the differences between patients with SCZ and HC.
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The GLM was set with sensitivity (d’) and response bias (B) indices as the
respective outcome, diagnosis (Groups: SCZ and HC) and type of
phenomenon (sincere, deceit and irony) as fixed factors (separately
evaluating the effect of Group by type of phenomenon), age, and general
intelligence as continuous covariates, gender as categorical covariate, and
varying effects by participant90,91. Scores of participants in the
communicative-pragmatic tasks and d-prime values (sensitivity) were
normally distributed in the two groups (HC and SCZ), as indicated by the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality (HC: D(24)= 0.143, p= 0.20; SCZ: D
(24)= 0.132; p= 0.20). Distribution of beta values is, by definition, left-
bounded and tends to be positively skewed; we therefore used Gamma
distribution which best approximates the distribution of response bias. For a
summary of the model see Table 4. Subsequently, to analyze the role of the
clinical variables on sensitivity and response bias, we used a GLM with
sensitivity (d’) and response bias (B) indices as outcome, separately
evaluating for each communicative phenomenon (sincere, deceit, and
irony) the effect of clinical variables as predictors, and varying effects by
participants. We included relevant predictors, i.e., severity of disorganized
(DIS), positive (POS), negative (Avl and ExD factors), depressive (CDSS score)
symptoms, and antipsychotic daily equivalent dosage (CPZ equivalent) in
the model starting from a null model including only intercept, and then
checking at each step whether the addition of each factor corresponds to a
significant increase in goodness of fit using the likelihood ratio test and the
Akaike information criterion (AIC). The final models are reported in Table 5.
Finally, to analyze the role of sensitivity and response bias values on the
social and personal functioning (PSP score), we used a generalized linear
model with PSP score as outcome, and evaluating the effect of beta and d-
prime values for each pragmatic phenomenon (sincere, deceit, and irony) as
predictors. We adopted the same procedure detailed above for the
inclusion of relevant predictors in the model.
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